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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
entitled to compensation based on the higher pay rate.29 Per-
haps a more difficult problem would have faced the court if the
plaintiff had been able to characterize the aggravations as sepa-
rate "accidents."' °




Revival of debt discharged in bankruptcy; What constitutes
promissory language sufficient to support subsequent legal action
on a debt discharged in bankruptcy? In Irwin v. Hunnewell,1
applying the well settled doctrine that a promise to pay a debt
discharged in a bankruptcy proceeding must be direct, definite,
unequivocal and more than a mere acknowledgment or expres-
sion of an intention, hope, desire or expectation to pay, the court
held that the plaintiff's action could not be maintained against
the bankrupt. 2 A message had been sent to the plaintiff that the
bill for his services "was to be taken care of" and that the ac-
count "would be paid." This was held not to be a definite prom-
ise to pay the debt. An expression in a subsequent letter that,
after payment of certain debts to the bankrupt's employer, the
plaintiff would "come first," was likewise held to be ineffective
as a promise. Similarly the bankrupt's expression-"my inten-
tions were good and the delay unavoidable"-coupled with an
offer to assign the proceeds of a life insurance policy payable at
death of the bankrupt to the plaintiff was held not to revive the
discharged debt.
The reason underlying the rule requiring an express and un-
equivocal promise to revive a debt discharged in bankruptcy is
that the discharge in bankruptcy extinguishes the pre-existing
debt and does not merely bar the remedy.4 In Louisiana, de-
spite vacillation in the jurisprudence on the question of whether
29. Holliday v. Martin Veneer Co., 206 La. 897, 20 So. (2d) 173 (1944).
30. Compare the interesting rationalization along this line in Harris v.
Southern Carbon Co., Inc., 162 So. 430 (La. App. 1935).
* Dean and Professor of Law, Louisiana State University Law School.
1. 207 La. 422, 21 So. (2d) 485 (1945).
2. 7 Remington, A Treatise on the Bankruptcy Law of the United States
(1939) § 3505.
3. See Linton v. Stanton, 4 La. Ann. 401 (1849).
4. See 7 Remington op. cit. supra note 2, at § 8501.
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the enumeration of the kinds of natural obligations set forth in
Article 1758 of the Civil Code 5 is exclusive, it has been held that
a debt discharged in bankruptcy will be considered a natural
obligation.' In the Irwin case the language of the court would
indicate that there is no distinction between the natural and the
moral obligation. In this respect, the court's treatment of nat-
ural and moral obligations as synonymous terms overlooks sound
civil law doctrine.7 Treated as a natural obligation it is clear
that a promise based on such an obligation is legally enforceable.,
The current doctrine requiring the reviving promise to be "defi-
nite, express, distinct and unambiguous" appears to be applied
correctly to the facts of the instant case.9 The court raised but
left open the question of whether an unequivocal oral promise
to pay a discharged debt is enforceable. It would seem that such
a promise is not required to be in written form and that Louisi-
ana would be in accord with the general doctrine that an oral
promise sufficiently definite in character will revive the debt.10
CORPORATIONS
Compensation for Past Services of Corporate Officers. The
decision in Stafford's Estate v. Progressive National Farm Loan
Associations" applied the well settled corporation law principle
that the salary of a corporate officer cannot be retroactively in-
creased. One of the principal issues in that case was the validity
of a note for back salary to the appellee as secretary-treasurer of
a farm loan association. The original resolution of appointment
5. See Succession of Miller v. Manhattan Life Insurance Co., 110 La. 652,
34 So. 713 (1903); Succession of Burns, 199 La. 1081, 7 So. (2d) 359 (1942), noted
In 17 Tulane Law Review 310 (1942). Contra: In re Atkins Estate, 30 F. (2d)
761 (C.C.A. 5th, 1929). An excellent treatment of the subject is found in
Martin, Natural Obligations (1941) 15 Tulane L. Rev. 497.
6. This is an analogical interpretation from Art. 1758(2), La. Civil Code
of 1870. Beck v. Howard, 3 La. Ann. 501 (1848); Bach v. Cohn, 3 La. Ann.
101 (1848); Bartlett v. Peck, 5 La. Ann. 669 (1850); Glenn v. Dunbar, 10 La.
Ann. 253 (1855).
7. See Note (1942) 17 Tulane L. Rev. 310-313; Martin, Natural Obliga-
tions (1941) 15 Tulane L. Rev. 497, 506: "The natural obligation requires
more than a moral duty. To be given effect, the obligation must be binding
not only 'in conscience' buc 'according to natural justice.'" Art. 1757, La.
Civil Code of 1870.
8. Art. 1759(2), La. Civil Code of 1870.
9. See Collier, Bankruptcy (14 ed. 1940) 1673, § 17.34. The new promise
may be made subsequent to the filing of the petition but before the dis-
charge. Zavelo v. Reeves, 227 U.S. 625, 33 S. Ct. 365, 57 L.Ed. 676 (1913).
10. Art. 2278, La. Civil Code of 1870, does not specifically cover a promise
to pay a debt discharged in bankruptcy and should not be extended by anal-
ogy. See Armstrong v. Baldwin, 181 So. 72 (La. App. 1938); Martin, supra
note 5, at 512-513. See 7 Remington, op. cit. supra note 2, at § 3503.
11. 207 La. 1097, 22 So. (2d) 662 (1945).
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had provided for compensation solely upon a fee basis. The note
in question was apparently predicated on a subsequent resolution
which provided that the secretary-treasurer should be compen-
sated on a salary basis at fifty dollars per month. In rejecting
the appellee's claim based upon this note, the court pointed out
that the resolution providing for compensation on a salary basis
was "wholly silent" with reference to past services, and that it
could not be validly effective as to past services. Justice Hamiter,
after a very comprehensive survey of prior Louisiana jurispru-
dence and general authorities in the field of corporation law,
applied the general rule that the voting or payment of compensa-
tion to corporate officers for past services is wholly without con-
sideration and ultra vires as a misapplication of corporate funds.
This holding is consistent with the general theory that the ordi-
nary services of corporate officers, unless otherwise expressly
stipulated in advance, are deemed to have been rendered with-
out expectation of compensation. The general rule against the
voting of back pay to corporate officers is bottomed on the idea
that they occupy a fiduciary relation and often control the pol-
icies and decisions of the corporation. The reason for the doc-
trine fails when the officer in question is a ministerial officer-as
a manager, supervisor, treasurer ol secretary-who exercises no
controlling influence over the board of directors. 2 The record
in the instant case does not disclose that the appellee had any
control or substantial voice in the control of the policies of the
association. The duties performed were of a ministerial nature
where it might logically be assumed reasonable compensation
was anticipated. Were it not for the fact that a prior resolution
had definitely fixed and limited the appellee's compensation on a
fee basis, the court might have recognized an exception to the
general rule to the extent of validating a resolution providing
a reasonable salary for the services rendered as secretary-treas-
urer of the association.
12. "The reason for the doctrine that the directors of a corporation are
not entitled to compensation In the absence of express provision or agree-
ment, either when acting as directors or in other offices, does not apply to
ministerial offlcers and employees-as a manager, superintendent, treasurer,
secretary, cashier, etc.-who are not directors, and have no control over the
property and funds of the corporation, even though they may be stock-
holders; and if such an officer or employee is elected or appointed to per-
form valuable services for the corporation under circumstances indicating
intention and expectation of payment, but without any express contract, the
law will imply a promise on the part of the corporation to pay a reasonable
compensation." Ballantine on Corporations (1927) 406.
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INSURANCE
Co-insurance Clause-Use and Occupancy Insurance. Act
136 of 192213 prohibits a clause in a fire or storm insurance policy
making the assured liable as co-insurer. A proviso in the statute
makes this prohibition inapplicable to policies issued upon prop-
erty valued at more than $25,000 or upon personal or movable
property. The application of this statute to a fire insurance pol-
icy covering loss of use and occupancy of a cotton warehouse
was involved in Arcadia Bonded Warehouse Company, Incor-
porated v. National Union Fire Insurance Company.14 The policy
was for five thousand dollars. Loss of the use and occupancy for
the three months required to rebuild the warehouse after a fire
amounted to $4,245.18. The company offered settlement for the
portion for which the company admitted liability under the co-
insurance clause. Relying upon the mentioned statute the insured
rejected the offer and sued for the total loss of the use and occu-
pancy, the statutory penalty of twelve per cent and attorney
fees.15 Under the 1922 statute it is necessary to determine (a)
that the policy on which the property is issued be worth more
than $25,000; or (b) that the policy is issued upon personal or
movable property, regardless of its value, in order to establish
the validity of the co-insurance clause. How is a policy which
protects insured only against loss of net profits, expenses and
charges not earned to be considered? The insurance company's
contention that the property upon which the policy was issued
should be considered incorporeal movable property was rejected
by the court. Chief Justice O'Niell concluded that the right on
which the policy was issued is the right of use and occupancy of
immovable property and that the property insured was therefore
to be classified as incorporeal immovable property under Article
470 of the Civil Code.1 6 While there was not a "use" as defined
in the Civil Code1 because the immovable property was owned
by the owner of the so-called use of the property, by analogy the
court concluded that the use and occupancy insurance should be
characterized as incorporeal immovable property. The court
13. Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4189.
14. 206 La. 682, 19 So. (2d) 514 (1944).
15. La. Act 168 of 1908 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 4177-4180].
16. Art. 470, La. Civil Code of 1870, provides: "Incorporeal things, con-
sisting only in a right, are not of themselves strictly susceptible of the
quality of movables or immovables; nevertheless they are placed in one or
the other of these classes, according to the object to which they apply and
the rules hereinafter established."
17. Art. 626, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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likewise rejected the company's contention that the net profits
and overhead expenses during the one year term of the policy
constituted the value of the subject matter insured. The value
of the property insured was held to be the unearned profits and
running expense for the three months required for reconstruction.
As the property insured was immovable property and as the
value was less than $25,000 the 1922 statute made the co-insur-
ance clause void.
This case raised the further question of the liability of the
insurer for the statutory penalty.18 Proofs of loss had not been
furnished as required by the statute, but this did not relieve the
insurance company from liability for the statutory penalty and
attorney fees because a complete investigation of the loss had
been made by the company and liability had been denied, thereby
making it unnecessary under the jurisprudence to furnish proofs
of loss on the company's forms.19
The' method of treatment in this case, while reaching a de-
sirable result, might have been obviated by pursuing the court's
alternative suggestion, namely, that the property insured was
the warehouse-immovable property-and that the amount of
unearned profits and overhead expenses should be considered as
merely measuring the extent of the company's liability.
Incendiarism as a defense. Incendiarism as a defense to an
action on a fire insurance policy was involved in Pizzolato v. Liv-
erpool & London Globe Insurance Company, Limited.2° The
question was essentially one of fact calling for application of the
well settled legal principles that incendiarism is an affirmative
defense with the burden of proof for its establishment by pre-
ponderance of the evidence upon the insurer; that circumstantial
evidence, as well as direct evidence, is admissible to prove the
defense; but that circumstantial evidence must do more than
cast a suspicion of guilt on the insured. Although the facts and
circumstances surrounding the fire were sufficiently suspicious
to have warranted investigation by the State Fire Marshal and
the filing of a charge of arson against the insured, the grand jury
18. La. Act 168 of 1908 (Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 4177-4180].
19. Mc, Celland v. Greenwich Insurance Co., 107 La. 124, 31 So. 691 (1902);
Thompson v. State Assurance Co., 160 La. 683, 107 So. 489 (1926); Talbert v.
Northwestern National Insurance Co., 167 La. 608, 120 So. 24 (1929) were re-
lied upon by the court. Tedesco v. Columbia Insurance Co. of New Jersey,
177 La. 142, 148 So. 8 (1933) was distinguished on the facts which indicated
active interference with orderly settlement and adjustment of the claim by
an insured who did not supply the requested proofs of loss as required by
Section 3 of La. Act 188 of 1908 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4179].
20, 207 La. 101, 20 Oo. (2d) 551 (1944).
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had refused to indict the insured. The court concluded on the
record that the district court was justified under the evidence in
rejecting the insurer's defense of incendiarism. The factors con-
tributing to this conclusion were several. There was testimony
by the local fire department head that the fire was so far ad-
vanced when it reached the scene that he could not tell how or
where the fire started despite his opinion that certain materials
smelling of oil were found with wire, string, matches, rags and
flashlight attached. Similarly, the record contained evidence
that indicated a possibility that the fire may have originated in
in a fireplace used by insured's tenant for cooking. Finally,
the court gave consideration to the facts that the amount of the
insurance was considerably less than the cost and value of the
property, that the policy was a renewal policy, and that the as-
sured owned a successful business and had money in the bank.
Finding lack of motive and inconclusive evidence as to the cause
of the fire, the court affirmed the trial court's judgment for the
amount of the policy, attorney fees and the statutory penalty of
twelve per cent. 2
1
Disability-Disease not common to both sexes. Campasi v.
Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Association22 was a suit by an
administrator for disability benefits alleged to be due to the as-
sured at the time of her death. Double the amount of the dis-
ability benefits and attorney fees were claimed under Act 310 of
191023 which imposes such liability upon an insurance company
guilty of delay in payment unless upon just and reasonable
grounds. The deceased assured was a woman who died of can-
cer originating in the ovary and which, prior to her death, had
metastasized, not only to the omentum, but to the intestines.
This was the physical condition of assured at the time claim was
made for disability benefits under a policy of insurance issued by
defendant. The policy contained a clause:
"' (a) This policy does not cover death, disability, or other
loss sustained in any part of the world except the United
States and Canada, or while engaged in military or naval
service, or while the Insured is not continuously under the
professional care and regular attendance, at least once a week,
beginning with the first treatment, of a licensed physician
or surgeon, other than himself; or received because of or while
21. La. Act 168 of 1908, § 3 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4179].
22. 207 La. 758, 22 So. (2d) 55 (1945).
23. Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 4106-4111.
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participating in aeronautics; or resulting from insanity; or
disability from any disease of organs which are not common
to both sexes.' ,,24
The insurance company contended that the disability resulted
from a disease of an organ not common to both sexes and that
the risk was excluded by the clause above cited. The court held
that such a clause does not exempt the insurance carrier from
liability for a disability originating in an organ not common to
both sexes which spreads to organs common to both sexes. In
the view of the court, the construction contended for by the com-
pany would require the court to interpolate the words "originat-
ing in" into the exempting clause and broaden its effect beyond
the written words of the clause or to change the punctuation and
structure of the exemption clause. The medical testimony in the
record amply supported the finding of the district court as to the
existence of a disability following the spread of the disease. The
action of the trial court in assessing the penalties imposed by
Act 310 of 1910 was affirmed. Just and reasonable grounds for
delay were found not to be present because the insurance car-
rier made no investigation following the proof of disability. If
such investigation had been made it would have informed the
insurer that the disability was due to a disease common to both
sexes. The insurer's delay continued during the remaining fifteen
months of the lifetime of the assured. These circumstances pre-
sented a strong case for the application of penalties despite the
fact that the clause here involved had not been previously inter-
preted by a Louisiana court.25 The defendant's argument that
the penalty statute is not applicable to suit by an administrator
but only to the assured individually was held too narrow a con-
struction of the statute.
While the result of this case is unquestionably sound, based
on the evidence which showed clearly that the disability could be
traced to the disease of cancer, which, at the time of the disability,
24. 207 La. 758, 766, 22 So. (2d) 55, 58 (1945).
25. Pointing out that sick benefits if not promptly paid are not benefits
at all and that the insurer was not entitled to litigate its contentions at the
expense of the assured-except upon Just and reasonable grounds, Chief Jus-
tice O'Niell, at 207 La. 758, 765, 22 So. (2d) 55, 57 (1945) further said: "Suits
like this, as a rule, are cases in which the law's delay amounts to a denial ofjustice. This suit has been pending for a year and 9 months,-which is 6
months longer than the assured lived after she gave the insurance company
notice and proof of her disability. Of what benefit can the so-called sick
benefits of $100 a month-or the $100 a month for hospitalization-be to one
who suffers for a year and three months in painful sickness, struggling to
approach the feet of Justice, and passes on without having a glimpse of
her fair face?"
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was present in organs common to both sexes, great emphasis was
placed on the fact that the cancer had spread to this extent. Is
recovery to be allowed only under such circumstances? Suppose
the disease had confined itself to an organ not common to both
sexes? There is considerable authority interpreting similar
clauses as not exempting the insurer from liability if the disease
is one to which both sexes are susceptible but which attacks an
organ peculiar to one sex. 20 Thus it has been held that a fibroid
tumor of the womb is not caused by a "'disease of the organs of
the body not common to both sexes'" since this disease may exist
in any fibrous organ in either man or woman. 27 A decision of
the Louisiana Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit appears to
be in accord with this view.2" The court in the Campasi case
might easily have based its decision on the broader ground that
the risk was not excluded even if the cancer had not metasta-
sized, as the disease of course is one common to both sexes.
Policyholder entitled to priority over the United States in
fund deposited as qualifying security. Is a claim of the United
States for income and social security taxes due by an insurance
company in receivership in Louisiana entitled to be paid out of
the proceeds of funds deposited with the state treasurer as quali-
fying security by preference or priority over the policy obliga-
tions of the company? In Conway v. Imperial Life Insurance
Company2" it was held that qualifying securities deposited by an
insurance company are held in trust for the policyholders and
that the claims of policyholders to the fund are superior to the
claims of the United States based on Section 3466 of the Revised
Statutes of the United States.2 0 Act 169 of 190831 requiring the
26. Mutual Benefit Health and Accident Association v. Blaylock, 163 Miss.
657, 143 So. 406 (1932). The cases are collected in an annotation (1933) 87
A.L.R. 681-682. But cf. Hamilton v. Mutual Ben. Health & Accident Associa-
tion, 133 Neb. 464, 275 N.W. 863 (1937). See 6 Couch, Cyclopedia of Insurance
Law (1930) 4668.
27. Business Men's Assur. Ass'n v. Read, 48 S.W. (2d) 678, 679 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1932); Stewart v. Hoosier Casualty Co., 67 Ohio App. 509, 37 N.E. (2d)
438 (1941).
28. Scott v. Continental Life Insurance Co., 15 La. App. 221, 131 So. 478
(1930). The clause here involved differed in phraseology excepting diseases
peculiar to women. Cf. Shuler v. American Benevolent Ass'n, 132 Mo. App.
123, 111 S.W. 618 (1908); National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. weaver, 226 S.W.
754 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920).
29. 207 La. 285, 21 So. (2d) 151 (1945).
30. "Whenever any person indebted to the United States is insolvent, or
whenever the estate of any deceased debtor, in the hands of the executors
or administrators, is insufficient to pay all the debts due from the deceased,
the debts due to the United States shall be first satisfied; and the priority
hereby established shall extend as well to cases in which a debtor, not having
sufficient property to pay all his debts, makes a voluntary assignment there-
of, or In which the estate and effects of an absconding, concealed or absent
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deposit of qualifying securities specifically provides that such
deposit shall be "held by the state treasurer in trust for the bene-
fit and protection of and as security for the policyholders of the
corporation. 3 2 Assets amounting to $23,185 in the form of bonds,
previously part of the reserve funds of the insurance company's
transferror along with other bonds of the company had been de-
posited as qualifying security in accordance with Act 169 of 1908.
On petition of the Secretary of State of Louisiana, a receiver was
appointed for the insurance company on the ground of insolvency.
In a previous decision the supreme court had ordered that the
United States be recognized as a creditor on the tableau of debts
for unpaid social security taxes of $1,364.24 and for unpaid in-
come taxes in the amount of $41,647.97. 83 As the previous decree
did not involve the question of priority, the receiver listed the
United States as an ordinary creditor subordinate to the claims
of policyholders to the fund of $16,563.25 in the hands of the re-
ceiver. The supreme court affirmed the action of the lower court
in refusing priority to the United States. Revised Statutes of the
United States, Section 3466, was held inapplicable to confer pri-
ority on the United States because of the "legal nature of the
corporation's assets from which satisfaction is sought to be ob-
tained." The court concluded that the Louisiana statute created
an expressed trust in favor of and for the benefit of the policy-
holders and that the securities were "earmarked, segregated and
set aside" for the protection of policyholders as a definite group.
This expressed trust was held to create priority in the policy-
holders over the claims of the United States. The court held
that the Louisiana statute created more than an inchoate general
lien and on this basis distinguished the case from United States
v. Knott,3 4 wherein the United States Supreme Court had sus-
tained a claim of the United States for priority against qualifying
securities deposited by a surety company reversing the decision
of the Supreme Court of Florida that such deposit was held in
trust for creditors.3 5
It is doubtful that the distinction drawn by the Louisiana
Supreme Court in this case will be sustained when this issue is
presented to the United States Supreme Court. In United States
debtor are attached by process of law, as to cases in which an act of bank-
ruptcy is committed." Rev. Stats. § 3466 (2 ed. 1878), 31 U.S.C.A. § 191 (1927).
31. Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 4083-4087.
32. La. Act 169 of 1908, § 4 [Dart's Stats. (1989) § 4086].
33. 198 La. 999, 5 So. (2d) 314 (1941).
34. 298 U.S. 544, 56 S.Ct. 902, 80 L.Ed. 1321, 104 A.L.R. 741 (1936).
85. Kelly v. Knott, 120 Fla. 580, 163 So. 64 (1935).
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v. Knott emphasis was placed on the fact that the persons who
would share in the proceeds of the deposited securities "could
not be known until they were exhausted in satisfaction of judg-
ments, or until the entry of the decree of distribution... .-3 The
fact that the Florida court had declared that the deposit was a
trust fund for creditors was considered as not conclusive. Simi-
lar reasoning would apply to the specific phraseology of the Lou-
isiana statute. Strong expressions in the recent case of United
States v. Waddill, Holland and Flinn, Incorporated,;- would indi-
cate that a claim for priority over the United States will be
closely scrutinized. It was suggested that even the exception of
a specific and perfected lien on the property might not be sus-
tained when that question is squarely presented. The United
States Supreme Court further said:
"But it is a matter of federal law as to whether a lien
created by a state statute is sufficiently specific and perfected
to raise questions as to the applicability of the priority given
the claims of the United States by an act of Congress. If the
priority of the United States is ever to be displaced by a local
statutory lien, federal courts must be free to examine the lien's
actual legal effect upon the parties. A state court's charac-
terization of a lien as specific and perfected, however conclu-
sive as a matter of state law, cannot operate by itself to im-
pair or supersede a long-standing Congressional declaration
of priority. '3 8
It would appear that the so-called trust declared by the Louisiana
statute will fare no better than the inchoate liens which the su-
preme court has held are subordinate to the government's priority
under Revised Statutes, Section 3466.
Effect of Dissolution of Insurance Company in State of In-
corporation. Owens v. Allied Underwriters9 involved the fol-
lowing: Six days after the defendant insurance company was
placed in receivership in Texas, the state of its incorporation, the
administrator of the estate of Owens filed suit in the Nineteenth
Judicial District for the Parish of East Baton Rouge, Louisiana,
on a $10,000 judgment obtained in the United States District
36. 298 U.S. 544, 550, 56 S.Ct. 902, 905, 80 L.Ed. 1321, 1327, 104 A.L.R. 741,
746 (1936).
37. 323 U.S. 353, 65 S.Ct. 304 (1945).
38. 323 U.S. 353, 356, 65 S.Ct. 304, 306 (1945). A landlord's lien and a city's
tax lien were held not "specific" so as to deprive the United States of
priority.
9. 207 La. 437, 21 So. (2d) 490 (1945),
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Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas. Defendant's qualify-
ing deposit with the state treasurer of Louisiana, in the amount
of $20,000.00 was attached and a lien and privilege claimed on the
fund. 0 Shortly thereafter a receiver to liquidate claims of citi-
zens of Louisiana was appointed by the Nineteenth Judicial Dis-
trict Court, Parish of East Baton Rouge. The Louisiana receiver
and the appropriate state officials filed exceptions of no cause
and no right of action and asked for dissolution of plaintiff's at-
tachment and dismissal of the suit. The supreme court affirmed
the dismissal of the plaintiff's action on the ground that the
Texas receivership proceedings operated as a dissolution of the
corporation. Apparently it was not disputed that judgment dis-
solving the Texas corporation had actually been entered by the
Texas court. It was held that the law of the state of incorpora-
tion governed its dissolution and that a corporation dissolved
under the laws of the state of its charter could not thereafter be
sued in another state. The court also held that the Louisiana
receivership proceedings, even though subsequent to the plain-
tiff's suit, would have caused the action to abate. Plaintiff's rem-
edy was held to be in the Louisiana receivership proceeding.41
The principal contentions of the plaintiffs were levelled
against giving the Texas judgment dissolving the corporation ex-
tra-territorial effect coupled with the argument that the suit
could be continued based on the decisions of Frederico Macaroni
Manufacturing Company v. Great Western Fire Insurance Com-
pany 42 and Lichtenstein Brothers & Company v. Gillett Broth-
ers.4 3 The two mentioned decisions were held inapplicable on the
ground that the first case involved liability of a surety on the in-
suror's bond and the second was a receivership under a cred-
itor's bill rather than a statutory receivership operating as a dis-
solution of the corporation.
There is ample authority to support the court's decision that
following dissolution, action cannot thereafter be maintained
against a corporation." The Louisiana cases hold that if a cor-
40. Deposit was a cashier's check in amount of $20,000 given to comply
with La. Act 158 of 1932 and as a condition precedent to doing business in
Louisiana. Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 4254-4255.
41. See Cognovich v. Sun Indemnity Co. of New York, 176 La. 373, 145
So. 774 (1933) holding that a judgment creditor's suit against a surety on the
qualifying bond of an insolvent foreign insurance company was properly
transferred to the court where the receivership proceedings were pending.
42. 173 La. 905, 139 So. 1 (1931).
43. 37 La. Ann. 522 (1885).
44. Numerous authorities are cited by the court, 207 La. 438, 442, 21 So.
(2d) 490, 491 (1945).
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poration is dissolved, actions by or against it abate.45 The crucial
question in cases of this lund is whether the appointment of the
receiver actually operates as a dissolution of the corporation
under applicable law.4 6 As it appeared that the corporation was
actually dissolved under Texas law the court correctly applied
principles of conflict of laws to this situation.4 7 But even though
a corporation is civilly dead in the state of incorporation, it may
be considered still alive in another state under a statute continu-
ing the corporate existence for the purpose of winding up in re-
spect to remedies of that state's citizens against property in its
jurisdiction.48  An interesting question not passed on by the





A comparatively large number of cases touching on proce-
dural questions were decided by the supreme court at its 1944-
1945 term, but, as is so often the case, the majority of these ques-
tions should never have been raised because of the certainty of
the rules which were invoked. However, several very intriguing
questions were presented to and decided by the court and will
undoubtedly lend themselves to more intensive study than is
contemplated by this summary.
Appeals, Appellate Jurisdiction and Procedure
Walsh v. Bush1 presents one of the increasingly numerous
phenomena growing out of the housing shortage which has
gripped the entire country. Here, plaintiff sued for $5,030.00
damages caused by defendant's interference with plaintiff's occu-
pancy of a residence and garage rented by him from defendant
45. Musson v. Richardson, 11 Rob. 37 (La. 1845); McCoy v. State Line
Oil & Gas Co., 180 La. 579, 157 So. 116 (1934). See La. Act 250 of 1928, § 62
[Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1142].
46. See Tangipahoa Bank & Trust Co. v. Guwang, 15 So. (2d) 148 (La.
App. 1943).
47. See 2 Beale, A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws (1935) H§ 157.2, 192.3.
48. 16 Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations (1942)§ 8115, citing Rodgers v. Adriatic Fire Ins. Co., 148 N.Y. 34, 42 N.E. 515 (1895).
49. See Cognovich v. Sun Indemnity Co. of New York, 176 La. 373, 145 So.
774 (1933), cited supra note 3.
* Lecturer on Louisiana Practice, Louisiana State University Law
School. Member of the Bar of Baton Rouge.
1. 206 La. 303, 19 So. (2d) 144 (1944).
